Network Working Group S. Chokhani
Request for Comments: 2527 CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.
Category: Informational W. Ford
VeriSign, Inc.
March 1999
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework
Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document presents a framework to assist the writers of
certificate policies or certification practice statements for
certification authorities and public key infrastructures. In
particular, the framework provides a comprehensive list of topics
that potentially (at the writer's discretion) need to be covered in a
certificate policy definition or a certification practice statement.
A public-key certificate (hereinafter "certificate") binds a public-
key value to a set of information that identifies the entity (such as
person, organization, account, or site) associated with use of the
corresponding private key (this entity is known as the "subject" of
the certificate). A certificate is used by a "certificate user" or
"relying party" that needs to use, and rely upon the accuracy of, the
public key distributed via that certificate (a certificate user is
typically an entity that is verifying a digital signature from the
certificate's subject or an entity sending encrypted data to the
subject). The degree to which a certificate user can trust the
binding embodied in a certificate depends on several factors. These
factors include the practices followed by the certification authority
(CA) in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy,
procedures, and security controls; the subject's obligations (for
example, in protecting the private key); and the stated undertakings
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and legal obligations of the CA (for example, warranties and
limitations on liability).
A Version 3 X.509 certificate may contain a field declaring that one
or more specific certificate policies applies to that certificate
[ISO1]. According to X.509, a certificate policy is "a named set of
rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
particular community and/or class of application with common security
requirements." A certificate policy may be used by a certificate user
to help in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein,
is sufficiently trustworthy for a particular application. The
certificate policy concept is an outgrowth of the policy statement
concept developed for Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail [PEM1] and
expanded upon in [BAU1].
A more detailed description of the practices followed by a CA in
issuing and otherwise managing certificates may be contained in a
certification practice statement (CPS) published by or referenced by
the CA. According to the American Bar Association Digital Signature
Guidelines (hereinafter "ABA Guidelines"), "a CPS is a statement of
the practices which a certification authority employs in issuing
certificates." [ABA1]
The purpose of this document is to establish a clear relationship
between certificate policies and CPSs, and to present a framework to
assist the writers of certificate policies or CPSs with their tasks.
In particular, the framework identifies the elements that may need to
be considered in formulating a certificate policy or a CPS. The
purpose is not to define particular certificate policies or CPSs, per
se.
The scope of this document is limited to discussion of the contents
of a certificate policy (as defined in X.509) or CPS (as defined in
the ABA Guidelines). In particular, this document describes the
types of information that should be considered for inclusion in a
certificate policy definition or a CPS. While the framework as
presented generally assumes use of the X.509 version 3 certificate
format, it is not intended that the material be restricted to use of
that certificate format. Rather, it is intended that this framework
be adaptable to other certificate formats that may come into use.
The scope does not extend to defining security policies generally
(such as organization security policy, system security policy, or
data labeling policy) beyond the policy elements that are considered
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of particular relevance to certificate policies or CPSs.
This document does not define a specific certificate policy or CPS.
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the general concepts
of digital signatures, certificates, and public-key infrastructure,
as used in X.509 and the ABA Guidelines.
This document makes use of the following defined terms:
Activation data - Data values, other than keys, that are required
to operate cryptographic modules and that need to be protected
(e.g., a PIN, a passphrase, or a manually-held key share).
CA-certificate - A certificate for one CA's public key issued by
another CA.
Certificate policy - A named set of rules that indicates the
applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or
class of application with common security requirements. For
example, a particular certificate policy might indicate
applicability of a type of certificate to the authentication of
electronic data interchange transactions for the trading of goods
within a given price range.
Certification path - An ordered sequence of certificates which,
together with the public key of the initial object in the path,
can be processed to obtain that of the final object in the path.
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) - A statement of the
practices which a certification authority employs in issuing
certificates.
Issuing certification authority (issuing CA) - In the context of a
particular certificate, the issuing CA is the CA that issued the
certificate (see also Subject certification authority).
Policy qualifier - Policy-dependent information that accompanies a
certificate policy identifier in an X.509 certificate.
Registration authority (RA) - An entity that is responsible for
identification and authentication of certificate subjects, but
that does not sign or issue certificates (i.e., an RA is delegated
certain tasks on behalf of a CA). [Note: The term Local
Registration Authority (LRA) is used elsewhere for the same
concept.]
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Relying party - A recipient of a certificate who acts in reliance
on that certificate and/or digital signatures verified using that
certificate. In this document, the terms "certificate user" and
"relying party" are used interchangeably.
Set of provisions - A collection of practice and/or policy
statements, spanning a range of standard topics, for use in
expressing a certificate policy definition or CPS employing the
approach described in this framework.
Subject certification authority (subject CA) - In the context of a
particular CA-certificate, the subject CA is the CA whose public
key is certified in the certificate (see also Issuing
certification authority).
This section explains the concepts of certificate policy and CPS, and
describes their relationship. Other related concepts are also
described. Some of the material covered in this section and in some
other sections is specific to certificate policies extensions as
defined X.509 version 3. Except for those sections, this framework
is intended to be adaptable to other certificate formats that may
come into use.
When a certification authority issues a certificate, it is providing
a statement to a certificate user (i.e., a relying party) that a
particular public key is bound to a particular entity (the
certificate subject). However, the extent to which the certificate
user should rely on that statement by the CA needs to be assessed by
the certificate user. Different certificates are issued following
different practices and procedures, and may be suitable for different
applications and/or purposes.
The X.509 standard defines a certificate policy as "a named set of
rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
particular community and/or class of application with common security
requirements"[ISO1]. An X.509 Version 3 certificate may contain an
indication of certificate policy, which may be used by a certificate
user to decide whether or not to trust a certificate for a particular
purpose.
A certificate policy, which needs to be recognized by both the issuer
and user of a certificate, is represented in a certificate by a
unique, registered Object Identifier. The registration process
follows the procedures specified in ISO/IEC and ITU standards. The
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party that registers the Object Identifier also publishes a textual
specification of the certificate policy, for examination by
certificate users. Any one certificate will typically declare a
single certificate policy or, possibly, be issued consistent with a
small number of different policies.
Certificate policies also constitute a basis for accreditation of
CAs. Each CA is accredited against one or more certificate policies
which it is recognized as implementing. When one CA issues a CA-
certificate for another CA, the issuing CA must assess the set of
certificate policies for which it trusts the subject CA (such
assessment may be based upon accreditation with respect to the
certificate policies involved). The assessed set of certificate
policies is then indicated by the issuing CA in the CA-certificate.
The X.509 certification path processing logic employs these
certificate policy indications in its well-defined trust model.
For example purposes, suppose that IATA undertakes to define some
certificate policies for use throughout the airline industry, in a
public-key infrastructure operated by IATA in combination with
public-key infrastructures operated by individual airlines. Two
certificate policies are defined - the IATA General-Purpose policy,
and the IATA Commercial-Grade policy.
The IATA General-Purpose policy is intended for use by industry
personnel for protecting routine information (e.g., casual electronic
mail) and for authenticating connections from World Wide Web browsers
to servers for general information retrieval purposes. The key pairs
may be generated, stored, and managed using low-cost, software-based
systems, such as commercial browsers. Under this policy, a
certificate may be automatically issued to anybody listed as an
employee in the corporate directory of IATA or any member airline who
submits a signed certificate request form to a network administrator
in his or her organization.
The IATA Commercial-Grade policy is used to protect financial
transactions or binding contractual exchanges between airlines.
Under this policy, IATA requires that certified key pairs be
generated and stored in approved cryptographic hardware tokens.
Certificates and tokens are provided to airline employees with
disbursement authority. These authorized individuals are required to
present themselves to the corporate security office, show a valid
identification badge, and sign an undertaking to protect the token
and use it only for authorized purposes, before a token and a
certificate are issued.
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The following extension fields in an X.509 certificate are used to
support certificate policies:
* Certificate Policies extension;
* Policy Mappings extension; and
* Policy Constraints extension.
The Certificate Policies extension has two variants - one with the
field flagged non-critical and one with the field flagged critical.
The purpose of the field is different in the two cases.
A non-critical Certificate Policies field lists certificate policies
that the certification authority declares are applicable. However,
use of the certificate is not restricted to the purposes indicated by
the applicable policies. Using the example of the IATA General-
Purpose and Commercial-Grade policies defined in Section 3.2, the
certificates issued to regular airline employees will contain the
object identifier for certificate policy for the General-Purpose
policy. The certificates issued to the employees with disbursement
authority will contain the object identifiers for both the General-
Purpose policy and the Commercial-Grade policy. The Certificate
Policies field may also optionally convey qualifier values for each
identified policy; use of qualifiers is discussed in Section 3.4.
The non-critical Certificate Policies field is designed to be used by
applications as follows. Each application is pre-configured to know
what policy it requires. Using the example in Section 3.2,
electronic mail applications and Web servers will be configured to
require the General-Purpose policy. However, an airline's financial
applications will be configured to require the Commercial-Grade
policy for validating financial transactions over a certain dollar
value.
When processing a certification path, a certificate policy that is
acceptable to the certificate-using application must be present in
every certificate in the path, i.e., in CA-certificates as well as
end entity certificates.
If the Certificate Policies field is flagged critical, it serves the
same purpose as described above but also has an additional role. It
indicates that the use of the certificate is restricted to one of the
identified policies, i.e., the certification authority is declaring
that the certificate must only be used in accordance with the
provisions of one of the listed certificate policies. This field is
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intended to protect the certification authority against damage claims
by a relying party who has used the certificate for an inappropriate
purpose or in an inappropriate manner, as stipulated in the
applicable certificate policy definition.
For example, the Internal Revenue Service might issue certificates to
taxpayers for the purpose of protecting tax filings. The Internal
Revenue Service understands and can accommodate the risks of
accidentally issuing a bad certificate, e.g., to a wrongly-
authenticated person. However, suppose someone used an Internal
Revenue Service tax-filing certificate as the basis for encrypting
multi-million-dollar-value proprietary secrets which subsequently
fell into the wrong hands because of an error in issuing the Internal
Revenue Service certificate. The Internal Revenue Service may want
to protect itself against claims for damages in such circumstances.
The critical-flagged Certificate Policies extension is intended to
mitigate the risk to the certificate issuer in such situations.
The Policy Mappings extension may only be used in CA-certificates.
This field allows a certification authority to indicate that certain
policies in its own domain can be considered equivalent to certain
other policies in the subject certification authority's domain.
For example, suppose the ACE Corporation establishes an agreement
with the ABC Corporation to cross-certify each others' public-key
infrastructures for the purposes of mutually protecting electronic
data interchange (EDI). Further, suppose that both companies have
pre-existing financial transaction protection policies called ace-e-
commerce and abc-e-commerce, respectively. One can see that simply
generating cross certificates between the two domains will not
provide the necessary interoperability, as the two companies'
applications are configured with and employee certificates are
populated with their respective certificate policies. One possible
solution is to reconfigure all of the financial applications to
require either policy and to reissue all the certificates with both
policies. Another solution, which may be easier to administer, uses
the Policy Mapping field. If this field is included in a cross-
certificate for the ABC Corporation certification authority issued by
the ACE Corporation certification authority, it can provide a
statement that the ABC's financial transaction protection policy
(i.e., abc-e-commerce) can be considered equivalent to that of the
ACE Corporation (i.e., ace-e-commerce).
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The Policy Constraints extension supports two optional features. The
first is the ability for a certification authority to require that
explicit certificate policy indications be present in all subsequent
certificates in a certification path. Certificates at the start of a
certification path may be considered by a certificate user to be part
of a trusted domain, i.e., certification authorities are trusted for
all purposes so no particular certificate policy is needed in the
Certificate Policies extension. Such certificates need not contain
explicit indications of certificate policy. However, when a
certification authority in the trusted domain certifies outside the
domain, it can activate the requirement for explicit certificate
policy in subsequent certificates in the certification path.
The other optional feature in the Policy Constraints field is the
ability for a certification authority to disable policy mapping by
subsequent certification authorities in a certification path. It may
be prudent to disable policy mapping when certifying outside the
domain. This can assist in controlling risks due to transitive
trust, e.g., a domain A trusts domain B, domain B trusts domain C,
but domain A does not want to be forced to trust domain C.
The Certificate Policies extension field has a provision for
conveying, along with each certificate policy identifier, additional
policy-dependent information in a qualifier field. The X.509
standard does not mandate the purpose for which this field is to be
used, nor does it prescribe the syntax for this field. Policy
qualifier types can be registered by any organization.
The following policy qualifier types are defined in PKIX Part I
[PKI1]:
(a) The CPS Pointer qualifier contains a pointer to a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) published by the CA.
The pointer is in the form of a uniform resource identifier
(URI).
(b) The User Notice qualifier contains a text string that is to be
displayed to a certificate user (including subscribers and
relying parties) prior to the use of the certificate. The
text string may be an IA5String or a BMPString - a subset of
the ISO 100646-1 multiple octet coded character set. A CA may
invoke a procedure that requires that the certficate user
acknowledge that the applicable terms and conditions have been
disclosed or accepted.
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Policy qualifiers can be used to support the definition of generic,
or parameterized, certificate policy definitions. Provided the base
certificate policy definition so provides, policy qualifier types can
be defined to convey, on a per-certificate basis, additional specific
policy details that fill in the generic definition.
The term certification practice statement (CPS) is defined by the ABA
Guidelines as: "A statement of the practices which a certification
authority employs in issuing certificates." [ABA1] In the 1995 draft
of the ABA guidelines, the ABA expands this definition with the
following comments:
A certification practice statement may take the form of a
declaration by the certification authority of the details of its
trustworthy system and the practices it employs in its operations
and in support of issuance of a certificate, or it may be a
statute or regulation applicable to the certification authority
and covering similar subject matter. It may also be part of the
contract between the certification authority and the subscriber. A
certification practice statement may also be comprised of multiple
documents, a combination of public law, private contract, and/or
declaration.
Certain forms for legally implementing certification practice
statements lend themselves to particular relationships. For
example, when the legal relationship between a certification
authority and subscriber is consensual, a contract would
ordinarily be the means of giving effect to a certification
practice statement. The certification authority's duties to a
relying person are generally based on the certification
authority's representations, which may include a certification
practice statement.
Whether a certification practice statement is binding on a relying
person depends on whether the relying person has knowledge or
notice of the certification practice statement. A relying person
has knowledge or at least notice of the contents of the
certificate used by the relying person to verify a digital
signature, including documents incorporated into the certificate
by reference. It is therefore advisable to incorporate a
certification practice statement into a certificate by reference.
As much as possible, a certification practice statement should
indicate any of the widely recognized standards to which the
certification authority's practices conform. Reference to widely
recognized standards may indicate concisely the suitability of the
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certification authority's practices for another person's purposes,
as well as the potential technological compatibility of the
certificates issued by the certification authority with
repositories and other systems.
STATEMENT
The concepts of certificate policy and CPS come from different
sources and were developed for different reasons. However, their
interrelationship is important.
A certification practice statement is a detailed statement by a
certification authority as to its practices, that potentially needs
to be understood and consulted by subscribers and certificate users
(relying parties). Although the level of detail may vary among CPSs,
they will generally be more detailed than certificate policy
definitions. Indeed, CPSs may be quite comprehensive, robust
documents providing a description of the precise service offerings,
detailed procedures of the life-cycle management of certificates, and
more - a level of detail which weds the CPS to a particular
(proprietary) implementation of a service offering.
Although such detail may be indispensable to adequately disclose, and
to make a full assessment of trustworthiness in the absence of
accreditation or other recognized quality metrics, a detailed CPS
does not form a suitable basis for interoperability between CAs
operated by different organizations. Rather, certificate policies
best serve as the vehicle on which to base common interoperability
standards and common assurance criteria on an industry-wide (or
possibly more global) basis. A CA with a single CPS may support
multiple certificate policies (used for different application
purposes and/or by different certificate user communities). Also,
multiple different CAs, with non-identical certification practice
statements, may support the same certificate policy.
For example, the Federal Government might define a government-wide
certificate policy for handling confidential human resources
information. The certificate policy definition will be a broad
statement of the general characteristics of that certificate policy,
and an indication of the types of applications for which it is
suitable for use. Different departments or agencies that operate
certification authorities with different certification practice
statements might support this certificate policy. At the same time,
such certification authorities may support other certificate
policies.
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The main difference between certificate policy and CPS can therefore
be summarized as follows:
(a) Most organizations that operate public or inter-
organizational certification authorities will document their
own practices in CPSs or similar statements. The CPS is one
of the organization's means of protecting itself and
positioning its business relationships with subscribers and
other entities.
(b) There is strong incentive, on the other hand, for a
certificate policy to apply more broadly than to just a single
organization. If a particular certificate policy is widely
recognized and imitated, it has great potential as the basis
of automated certificate acceptance in many systems, including
unmanned systems and systems that are manned by people not
independently empowered to determine the acceptability of
different presented certificates.
In addition to populating the certificate policies field with the
certificate policy identifier, a certification authority may include,
in certificates it issues, a reference to its certification practice
statement. A standard way to do this, using a certificate policy
qualifier, is described in Section 3.4.
A set of provisions is a collection of practice and/or policy
statements, spanning a range of standard topics, for use in
expressing a certificate policy definition or CPS employing the
approach described in this framework.
A certificate policy can be expressed as a single set of provisions.
A CPS can be expressed as a single set of provisions with each
component addressing the requirements of one or more certificate
policies, or, alternatively, as an organized collection of sets of
provisions. For example, a CPS could be expressed as a combination
of the following:
(a) a list of certificate policies supported by the CPS;
(b) for each certificate policy in (a), a set of provisions which
contains statements that refine that certificate policy by
filling in details not stipulated in that policy or expressly
left to the discretion of the CPS by that certificate policy;
such statements serve to state how this particular CPS
implements the requirements of the particular certificate
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policy;
(c) a set of provisions that contains statements regarding the
certification practices on the CA, regardless of certificate
policy.
The statements provided in (b) and (c) may augment or refine the
stipulations of the applicable certificate policy definition, but
must not conflict with any of the stipulations of such certificate
policy definition.
This framework outlines the contents of a set of provisions, in terms
of eight primary components, as follows:
* Introduction;
* General Provisions;
* Identification and Authentication;
* Operational Requirements;
* Physical, Procedural, and Personnel Security Controls;
* Technical Security Controls;
* Certificate and CRL Profile; and
* Specification Administration.
Components can be further divided into subcomponents, and a
subcomponent may comprise multiple elements. Section 4 provides a
more detailed description of the contents of the above components,
and their subcomponents.
This section expands upon the contents of a set of provisions, as
introduced in Section 3.7. The topics identified in this section
are, consequently, candidate topics for inclusion in a certificate
policy definition or CPS.
While many topics are identified, it is not necessary for a
certificate policy or a CPS to include a concrete statement for every
such topic. Rather, a particular certificate policy or CPS may state
"no stipulation" for a component, subcomponent, or element on which
the particular certificate policy or CPS imposes no requirements. In
this sense, the list of topics can be considered a checklist of
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topics for consideration by the certificate policy or CPS writer. It
is recommended that each and every component and subcomponent be
included in a certificate policy or CPS, even if there is "no
stipulation"; this will indicate to the reader that a conscious
decision was made to include or exclude that topic. This protects
against inadvertent omission of a topic, while facilitating
comparison of different certificate policies or CPSs, e.g., when
making policy mapping decisions.
In a certificate policy definition, it is possible to leave certain
components, subcomponents, and/or elements unspecified, and to
stipulate that the required information will be indicated in a policy
qualifier. Such certificate policy definitions can be considered
parameterized definitions. The set of provisions should reference or
define the required policy qualifier types and should specify any
applicable default values.
This component identifies and introduces the set of provisions, and
indicates the types of entities and applications for which the
specification is targeted.
This component has the following subcomponents:
* Overview;
* Identification;
* Community and Applicability; and
* Contact Details.
This subcomponent describes the types of entities that issue
certificates or that are certified as subject CAs (2, 3), the types
of entities that perform RA functions (4), and the types of entities
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that are certified as subject end entities or subscribers. (5, 6)
This subcomponent also contains:
* A list of applications for which the issued certificates are
suitable. (Examples of application in this case are: electronic
mail, retail transactions, contracts, travel order, etc.)
* A list of applications for which use of the issued certificates
is restricted. (This list implicitly prohibits all other uses
for the certificates.)
* A list of applications for which use of the issued certificates
is prohibited.
This subcomponent includes the name and mailing address of the
authority that is responsible for the registration, maintenance, and
interpretation of this certificate policy or CPS. It also includes
the name, electronic mail address, telephone number, and fax number
of a contact person.
This component specifies any applicable presumptions on a range of
legal and general practices topics.
This component contains the following subcomponents:
* Obligations;
* Liability;
* Financial Responsibility;
* Interpretation and Enforcement;
* Fees;
* Publication and Repositories;
* Compliance Audit;
* Confidentiality; and
* Intellectual Property Rights.
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Each subcomponent may need to separately state provisions applying to
the entity types: CA, repository, RA, subscriber, and relying party.
(Specific provisions regarding subscribers and relying parties are
only applicable in the Liability and Obligations subcomponents.)
This subcomponent contains, for each entity type, any applicable
provisions regarding the entity's obligations to other entities.
Such provisions may include:
* CA and/or RA obligations:
* Notification of issuance of a certificate to the
subscriber who is the subject of the certificate being
issued;
* Notification of issuance of a certificate to others
than the subject of the certificate;
* Notification of revocation or suspension of a
certificate to the subscriber whose certificate is being
revoked or suspended; and
* Notification of revocation or suspension of a
certificate to others than the subject whose certificate
is being revoked or suspended.
* Subscriber obligations:
* Accuracy of representations in certificate application;
* Protection of the entity's private key;
* Restrictions on private key and certificate use; and
* Notification upon private key compromise.
* Relying party obligations:
* Purposes for which certificate is used;
* Digital signature verification responsibilities;
* Revocation and suspension checking responsibilities;
and
* Acknowledgment of applicable liability caps and
warranties.
* Repository obligations
* Timely publication of certificates and revocation
information
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This subcomponent contains, for each entity type, any applicable
provisions regarding apportionment of liability, such as:
* Warranties and limitations on warranties;
* Kinds of damages covered (e.g., indirect, special,
consequential, incidental, punitive, liquidated damages,
negligence and fraud) and disclaimers;
* Loss limitations (caps) per certificate or per transaction; and
* Other exclusions (e.g., Acts of God, other party
responsibilities).
This subcomponent contains, for CAs, repository, and RAs, any
applicable provisions regarding financial responsibilities, such as:
* Indemnification of CA and/or RA by relying parties;
* Fiduciary relationships (or lack thereof) between the various
entities; and
* Administrative processes (e.g., accounting, audit).
This subcomponent contains any applicable provisions regarding
interpretation and enforcement of the certificate policy or CPS,
addressing such topics as:
* Governing law;
* Severability of provisions, survival, merger, and notice; and
* Dispute resolution procedures.
This subcomponent contains any applicable provisions regarding fees
charged by CAs, repositories, or RAs, such as:
* Certificate issuance or renewal fees;
* Certificate access fee;
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* Revocation or status information access fee;
* Fees for other services such as policy information; and
* Refund policy.
This subcomponent contains any applicable provisions regarding:
* A CA's obligations to publish information regarding its
practices, its certificates, and the current status of such
certificates;
* Frequency of publication;
* Access control on published information objects including
certificate policy definitions, CPS, certificates, certificate
status, and CRLs; and
* Requirements pertaining to the use of repositories operated by
CAs or by other independent parties.
This subcomponent addresses the following:
* Frequency of compliance audit for each entity;
* Identity/qualifictions of the auditor;
* Auditor's relationship to the entity being audited; (30)
* List of topics covered under the compliance audit; (31)
* Actions taken as a result of a deficiency found during
compliance audit; (32)
* Compliance audit results: who they are shared with (e.g.,
subject CA, RA, and/or end entities), who provides them (e.g.,
entity being audited or auditor), how they are communicated.
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This subcomponent addresses the following:
* Types of information that must be kept confidential by CA or RA;
* Types of information that are not considered confidential;
* Who is entitled to be informed of reasons for revocation and
suspension of certificates;
* Policy on release of information to law enforcement officials;
* Information that can be revealed as part of civil discovery;
* Conditions upon which CA or RA may disclose upon owner's
request; and
* Any other circumstances under which confidential information may
be disclosed.
This component describes the procedures used to authenticate a
certificate applicant to a CA or RA prior to certificate issuance.
It also describes how parties requesting rekey or revocation are
authenticated. This component also addresses naming practices,
including name ownership recognition and name dispute resolution.
This component has the following subcomponents:
* Initial Registration;
* Routine Rekey;
* Rekey After Revocation; and
* Revocation Request.
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This subcomponent includes the following elements regarding
identification and authentication procedures during entity
registration or certificate issuance:
* Types of names assigned to the subject (7);
* Whether names have to be meaningful or not (8);
* Rules for interpreting various name forms;
* Whether names have to be unique;
* How name claim disputes are resolved;
* Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks;
* If and how the subject must prove possession of the companion
private key for the public key being registered (9);
* Authentication requirements for organizational identity of
subject (CA, RA, or end entity) (10);
* Authentication requirements for a person acting on behalf of a
subject (CA, RA, or end entity) (11), including:
* Number of pieces of identification required;
* How a CA or RA validates the pieces of identification
provided;
* If the individual must present personally to the
authenticating CA or RA;
* How an individual as an organizational person is
authenticated (12).
This subcomponent describes the identification and authentication
procedures for rekey for each subject type (CA, RA, and end entity)
after the subject certificate has been revoked. (14)
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This subcomponent describes the identification and authentication
procedures for a revocation request by each subject type (CA, RA, and
end entity). (16)
This component is used to specify requirements imposed upon issuing
CA, subject CAs, RAs, or end entities with respect to various
operational activities.
This component consists of the following subcomponents:
* Certificate Application;
* Certificate Issuance;
* Certificate Acceptance;
* Certificate Suspension and Revocation;
* Security Audit Procedures;
* Records Archival;
* Key Changeover;
* Compromise and Disaster Recovery; and
* CA Termination.
Within each subcomponent, separate consideration may need to be given
to issuing CA, repository, subject CAs, RAs, and end entities.
This subcomponent is used to state requirements regarding issuance of
a certificate and notification to the applicant of such issuance.
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This subcomponent addresses the following:
* Circumstances under which a certificate may be revoked;
* Who can request the revocation of the entity certificate;
* Procedures used for certificate revocation request;
* Revocation request grace period available to the subject;
* Circumstances under which a certificate may be suspended;
* Who can request the suspension of a certificate;
* Procedures to request certificate suspension;
* How long the suspension may last;
* If a CRL mechanism is used, the issuance frequency;
* Requirements on relying parties to check CRLs;
* On-line revocation/status checking availability;
* Requirements on relying parties to perform on-line
revocation/status checks;
* Other forms of revocation advertisements available; and
* Requirements on relying parties to check other forms of
revocation advertisements.
* Any variations on the above stipulations when the suspension or
revocation is the result of private key compromise (as opposed
to other reasons for suspension or revocation).
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This subcomponent is used to describe event logging and audit
systems, implemented for the purpose of maintaining a secure
environment. Elements include the following:
* Types of events recorded; (28)
* Frequency with which audit logs are processed or audited;
* Period for which audit logs are kept;
* Protection of audit logs:
- Who can view audit logs;
- Protection against modification of audit log; and
- Protection against deletion of audit log.
* Audit log back up procedures;
* Whether the audit log accumulation system is internal or
external to the entity;
* Whether the subject who caused an audit event to occur is
notified of the audit action; and
* Vulnerability assessments.
This subcomponent is used to describe general records archival (or
records retention) policies, including the following:
* Types of events recorded; (29)
* Retention period for archive;
* Protection of archive:
- Who can view the archive;
- Protection against modification of archive; and
- Protection against deletion of archive.
* Archive backup procedures;
* Requirements for time-stamping of records;
* Whether the archive collection system is internal or external;
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and
* Procedures to obtain and verify archive information.
This subcomponent describes requirements relating to notification and
recovery procedures in the event of compromise or disaster. Each of
the following circumstances may need to be addressed separately:
* The recovery procedures used if computing resources, software,
and/or data are corrupted or suspected to be corrupted. These
procedures describe how a secure environment is reestablished,
which certificates are revoked, whether the entity key is
revoked, how the new entity public key is provided to the users,
and how the subjects are recertified.
* The recovery procedures used if the entity public key is
revoked. These procedures describe how a secure environment is
reestablished, how the new entity public key is provided to the
users, and how the subjects are recertified.
* The recovery procedures used if the entity key is compromised.
These procedures describe how a secure environment is
reestablished, how the new entity public key is provided to the
users, and how the subjects are recertified.
* The CA's procedures for securing its facility during the period
of time following a natural or other disaster and before a
secure environment is reestablished either at the original site
or a remote hot-site. For example, procedures to protect
against theft of sensitive materials from an earthquake-damaged
site.
This subcomponent describes requirements relating to procedures for
termination and for termination notification of a CA or RA, including
the identity of the custodian of CA and RA archival records.
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This component describes non-technical security controls (that is,
physical, procedural, and personnel controls) used by the issuing CA
to perform securely the functions of key generation, subject
authentication, certificate issuance, certificate revocation, audit,
and archival.
This component can also be used to define non-technical security
controls on repository, subject CAs, RAs, and end entities. The non
technical security controls for the subject CAs, RAs, and end
entities could be the same, similar, or very different.
These non-technical security controls are critical to trusting the
certificates since lack of security may compromise CA operations
resulting, for example, in the creation of certificates or CRLs with
erroneous information or the compromise of the CA private key.
This component consists of three subcomponents:
* Physical Security Controls;
* Procedural Controls; and
* Personnel Security Controls.
Within each subcomponent, separate consideration will, in general,
need to be given to each entity type, that is, issuing CA,
repository, subject CAs, RAs, and end entities.
In this subcomponent, the physical controls on the facility housing
the entity systems are described.(21) Topics addressed may include:
* Site location and construction;
* Physical access;
* Power and air conditioning;
* Water exposures;
* Fire prevention and protection;
* Media storage;
* Waste disposal; and
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* Off-site backup.
In this subcomponent, requirements for recognizing trusted roles are
described, together with the responsibilities for each role.(22)
For each task identified for each role, it should also be stated how
many individuals are required to perform the task (n out m rule).
Identification and authentication requirements for each role may also
be defined.
This subcomponent addresses the following:
* Background checks and clearance procedures required for the
personnel filling the trusted roles; (23)
* Background checks and clearance procedures requirements for
other personnel, including janitorial staff; (24)
* Training requirements and training procedures for each role;
* Any retraining period and retraining procedures for each role;
* Frequency and sequence for job rotation among various roles;
* Sanctions against personnel for unauthorized actions,
unauthorized use of authority, and unauthorized use of entity
systems; (25)
* Controls on contracting personnel, including:
- Bonding requirements on contract personnel;
- Contractual requirements including indemnification for
damages due to the actions of the contractor personnel;
- Audit and monitoring of contractor personnel; and
- Other controls on contracting personnel.
* Documentation to be supplied to personnel.
This component is used to define the security measures taken by the
issuing CA to protect its cryptographic keys and activation data
(e.g., PINs, passwords, or manually-held key shares). This component
may also be used to impose constraints on repositories, subject CAs
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and end entities to protect their cryptographic keys and critical
security parameters. Secure key management is critical to ensure
that all secret and private keys and activation data are protected
and used only by authorized personnel.
This component also describes other technical security controls used
by the issuing CA to perform securely the functions of key
generation, user authentication, certificate registration,
certificate revocation, audit, and archival. Technical controls
include life-cycle security controls (including software development
environment security, trusted software development methodology) and
operational security controls.
This component can also be used to define other technical security
controls on repositories, subject CAs, RAs, and end entities.
This component has the following subcomponents:
* Key Pair Generation and Installation;
* Private Key Protection;
* Other Aspects of Key Pair Management;
* Activation Data;
* Computer Security Controls;
* Life-Cycle Security Controls;
* Network Security Controls; and
* Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls.
Key pair generation and installation need to be considered for the
issuing CA, repositories, subject CAs, RAs, and subject end entities.
For each of these types of entities, the following questions
potentially need to be answered:
1. Who generates the entity public, private key pair?
2. How is the private key provided securely to the entity?
3. How is the entity's public key provided securely to the
certificate issuer?
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4. If the entity is a CA (issuing or subject) how is the entity's
public key provided securely to the users?
5. What are the key sizes?
6. Who generates the public key parameters?
7. Is the quality of the parameters checked during key generation?
8. Is the key generation performed in hardware or software?
9. For what purposes may the key be used, or for what purposes
should usage of the key be restricted (for X.509 certificates,
these purposes should map to the key usage flags in the Version
3, X.509 certificates)?
Requirements for private key protection need to be considered for the
issuing CA, repositories, subject CAs, RAs, and subject end entities.
For each of these types of entity, the following questions
potentially need to be answered:
1. What standards, if any, are required for the module used to
generate the keys? For example, are the keys certified by the
infrastructure required to be generated using modules complaint
with the US FIPS 140-1? If so, what is the required FIPS 140-1
level of the module?
2. Is the private key under n out of m multi-person control?(18)
If yes, provide n and m (two person control is a special case
of n out of m, where n = m = 2)?
3. Is the private key escrowed? (19) If so, who is the escrow
agent, what form is the key escrowed in (examples include
plaintext, encrypted, split key), and what are the security
controls on the escrow system?
4. Is the private key backed up? If so, who is the backup agent,
what form is the key backed up in (examples include plaintext,
encrypted, split key), and what are the security controls on
the backup system?
5. Is the private key archived? If so, who is the archival agent,
what form is the key archived in (examples include plaintext,
encrypted, split key), and what are the security controls on
the archival system?
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6. Who enters the private key in the cryptographic module? In
what form (i.e., plaintext, encrypted, or split key)? How is
the private key stored in the module (i.e., plaintext,
encrypted, or split key)?
7. Who can activate (use) the private key? What actions must be
performed to activate the private key (e.g., login, power on,
supply PIN, insert token/key, automatic, etc.)? Once the key
is activated, is the key active for an indefinite period,
active for one time, or active for a defined time period?
8. Who can deactivate the private key and how? Example of how
might include, logout, power off, remove token/key, automatic,
or time expiration.
9. Who can destroy the private key and how? Examples of how might
include token surrender, token destruction, or key overwrite.
Other aspects of key management need to be considered for the issuing
CA, repositories, subject CAs, RAs, and subject end entities. For
each of these types of entity, the following questions potentially
need to be answered:
1. Is the public key archived? If so, who is the archival agent
and what are the security controls on the archival system? The
archival system should provide integrity controls other than
digital signatures since: the archival period may be greater
than the cryptanalysis period for the key and the archive
requires tamper protection, which is not provided by digital
signatures.
2. What are the usage periods, or active lifetimes, for the public
and the private key respectively?
Activation data refers to data values other than keys that are
required to operate cryptographic modules and that need to be
protected. (20) Protection of activation data potentially needs to
be considered for the issuing CA, subject CAs, RAs, and end entities.
Such consideration potentially needs to address the entire life-cycle
of the activation data from generation through archival and
destruction. For each of the entity types (issuing CA, repository,
subject CA, RA, and end entity) all of the questions listed in 4.6.1
through 4.6.3 potentially need to be answered with respect to
activation data rather than with respect to keys.
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This subcomponent is used to describe computer security controls such
as: use of the trusted computing base concept, discretionary access
control, labels, mandatory access controls, object reuse, audit,
identification and authentication, trusted path, security testing,
and penetration testing. Product assurance may also be addressed.
A computer security rating for computer systems may be required. The
rating could be based, for example, on the Trusted System Evaluation
Criteria (TCSEC), Canadian Trusted Products Evaluation Criteria,
European Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC),
or the Common Criteria. This subcomponent can also address
requirements for product evaluation analysis, testing, profiling,
product certification, and/or product accreditation related activity
undertaken.
This subcomponent addresses system development controls and security
management controls.
System development controls include development environment security,
development personnel security, configuration management security
during product maintenance, software engineering practices, software
development methodology, modularity, layering, use of failsafe design
and implementation techniques (e.g., defensive programming) and
development facility security.
Security management controls include execution of tools and
procedures to ensure that the operational systems and networks adhere
to configured security. These tools and procedures include checking
the integrity of the security software, firmware, and hardware to
ensure their correct operation.
This subcomponent can also address life-cycle security ratings based,
for example, on the Trusted Software Development Methodology (TSDM)
level IV and V, independent life-cycle security controls audit, and
the Software Engineering Institute's Capability Maturity Model (SEI-
CMM).
This subcomponent addresses the following aspects of a cryptographic
module: identification of the cryptographic module boundary,
input/output, roles and services, finite state machine, physical
security, software security, operating system security, algorithm
compliance, electromagnetic compatibility, and self tests.
Requirements may be expressed through reference to a standard such as
U.S. FIPS 140-1. (27)
This component is used to specify the certificate format and, if CRLs
are used, the CRL format. Assuming use of the X.509 certificate and
CRL formats, this includes information on profiles, versions, and
extensions used.
This component has two subcomponents:
* Certificate Profile; and
* CRL Profile.
This subcomponent addresses such topics as the following (potentially
by reference to a separate profile definition, such as the PKIX Part
I profile):
* Version number(s) supported;
* Certificate extensions populated and their criticality;
* Cryptographic algorithm object identifiers;
* Name forms used for the CA, RA, and end entity names;
* Name constraints used and the name forms used in the name
constraints;
* Applicable certificate policy Object Identifier(s);
* Usage of the policy constraints extension;
* Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics; and
* Processing semantics for the critical certificate policy
extension.
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This subcomponent addresses such topics as the following (potentially
by reference to a separate profile definition, such as the PKIX Part
I profile):
* Version numbers supported for CRLs; and
* CRL and CRL entry extensions populated and their criticality.
This component is used to specify how this particular certificate
policy definition or CPS will be maintained.
It contains the following subcomponents:
* Specification Change Procedures;
* Publication and Notification Procedures; and
* CPS Approval Procedures.
It will occasionally be necessary to change certificate policies and
Certification Practice Statements. Some of these changes will not
materially reduce the assurance that a certificate policy or its
implementation provides, and will be judged by the policy
administrator as not changing the acceptability of certificates
asserting the policy for the purposes for which they have been used.
Such changes to certificate policies and Certification Practice
Statements need not require a change in the certificate policy Object
Identifier or the CPS pointer (URL). Other changes to a
specification will change the acceptability of certificates for
specific purposes, and these changes will require changes to the
certificate policy Object Identifier or CPS pointer (URL).
This subcomponent contains the following information:
* A list of specification components, subcomponents, and/or
elements thereof that can be changed without notification and
without changes to the certificate policy Object Identifier or
CPS pointer (URL).
* A list of specification components, subcomponents, and/or
elements thereof that may change following a notification period
without changing the certificate policy Object Identifier or CPS
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pointer (URL). The procedures to be used to notify interested
parties (relying parties, certification authorities, etc.) of
the certificate policy or CPS changes are described. The
description of notification procedures includes the notification
mechanism, notification period for comments, mechanism to
receive, review and incorporate the comments, mechanism for
final changes to the policy, and the period before final changes
become effective.
* A list of specification components, subcomponents, and/or
elements, changes to which require a change in certificate
policy Object Identifier or CPS pointer (URL)..
This subcomponent contains the following elements:
* A list of components, subcomponents, and elements thereof that
exist but that are not made publicly available; (33)
* Descriptions of mechanisms used to distribute the certificate
policy definition or CPS, including access controls on such
distribution.
This section contains a possible outline for a set of provisions,
intended to serve as a checklist or (with some further development) a
standard template for use by certificate policy or CPS writers. Such
a common outline will facilitate:
(a) Comparison of two certificate policies during cross-
certification (for the purpose of equivalency mapping).
(b) Comparison of a CPS with a certificate policy definition to
ensure that the CPS faithfully implements the policy.
(c) Comparison of two CPSs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
1.2 Identification
1.3 Community and Applicability
1.3.1 Certification authorities
1.3.2 Registration authorities
1.3.3 End entities
1.3.4 Applicability
1.4 Contact Details
1.4.1 Specification administration organization
1.4.2 Contact person
1.4.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
2. GENERAL PROVISIONS
2.1 Obligations
2.1.1 CA obligations
2.1.2 RA obligations
2.1.3 Subscriber obligations
2.1.4 Relying party obligations
2.1.5 Repository obligations
2.2 Liability
2.2.1 CA liability
2.2.2 RA liability
2.3 Financial responsibility
2.3.1 Indemnification by relying parties
2.3.2 Fiduciary relationships
2.3.3 Administrative processes
2.4 Interpretation and Enforcement
2.4.1 Governing law
2.4.2 Severability, survival, merger, notice
2.4.3 Dispute resolution procedures
2.5 Fees
2.5.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees
2.5.2 Certificate access fees
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2.5.3 Revocation or status information access fees
2.5.4 Fees for other services such as policy information
2.5.5 Refund policy
2.6 Publication and Repository
2.6.1 Publication of CA information
2.6.2 Frequency of publication
2.6.3 Access controls
2.6.4 Repositories
2.7 Compliance audit
2.7.1 Frequency of entity compliance audit
2.7.2 Identity/qualifications of auditor
2.7.3 Auditor's relationship to audited party
2.7.4 Topics covered by audit
2.7.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency
2.7.6 Communication of results
2.8 Confidentiality
2.8.1 Types of information to be kept confidential
2.8.2 Types of information not considered confidential
2.8.3 Disclosure of certificate revocation/suspension information
2.8.4 Release to law enforcement officials
2.8.5 Release as part of civil discovery
2.8.6 Disclosure upon owner's request
2.8.7 Other information release circumstances
2.9 Intellectual Property Rights
3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (34)
3.1 Initial Registration
3.1.1 Types of names
3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful
3.1.3 Rules for interpreting various name forms
3.1.4 Uniqueness of names
3.1.5 Name claim dispute resolution procedure
3.1.6 Recognition, authentication and role of trademarks
3.1.7 Method to prove possession of private key
3.1.8 Authentication of organization identity
3.1.9 Authentication of individual identity
3.2 Routine Rekey
3.3 Rekey after Revocation
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3.4 Revocation Request
4. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS (34)
4.1 Certificate Application
4.2 Certificate Issuance
4.3 Certificate Acceptance
4.4 Certificate Suspension and Revocation
4.4.1 Circumstances for revocation
4.4.2 Who can request revocation
4.4.3 Procedure for revocation request
4.4.4 Revocation request grace period
4.4.5 Circumstances for suspension
4.4.6 Who can request suspension
4.4.7 Procedure for suspension request
4.4.8 Limits on suspension period
4.4.9 CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)
4.4.10 CRL checking requirements
4.4.11 On-line revocation/status checking availability
4.4.12 On-line revocation checking requirements
4.4.13 Other forms of revocation advertisements available
4.4.14 Checking requirements for other forms of revocation
advertisements
4.4.15 Special requirements re key compromise
4.5 Security Audit Procedures
4.5.1 Types of event recorded
4.5.2 Frequency of processing log
4.5.3 Retention period for audit log
4.5.4 Protection of audit log
4.5.5 Audit log backup procedures
4.5.6 Audit collection system (internal vs external)
4.5.7 Notification to event-causing subject
4.5.8 Vulnerability assessments
4.6 Records Archival
4.6.1 Types of event recorded
4.6.2 Retention period for archive
4.6.3 Protection of archive
4.6.4 Archive backup procedures
4.6.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records
4.6.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)
4.6.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
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4.7 Key changeover
4.8 Compromise and Disaster Recovery
4.8.1 Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
4.8.2 Entity public key is revoked
4.8.3 Entity key is compromised
4.8.4 Secure facility after a natural or other type of disaster
4.9 CA Termination
5. PHYSICAL, PROCEDURAL, AND PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS (34)
5.1 Physical Controls
5.1.1 Site location and construction
5.1.2 Physical access
5.1.3 Power and air conditioning
5.1.4 Water exposures
5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection
5.1.6 Media storage
5.1.7 Waste disposal
5.1.8 Off-site backup
5.2 Procedural Controls
5.2.1 Trusted roles
5.2.2 Number of persons required per task
5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role
5.3 Personnel Controls
5.3.1 Background, qualifications, experience, and clearance
requirements
5.3.2 Background check procedures
5.3.3 Training requirements
5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements
5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence
5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions
5.3.7 Contracting personnel requirements
5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel
6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS (34)
6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation
6.1.1 Key pair generation
6.1.2 Private key delivery to entity
6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer
6.1.4 CA public key delivery to users
6.1.5 Key sizes
6.1.6 Public key parameters generation
6.1.7 Parameter quality checking
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6.1.8 Hardware/software key generation
6.1.9 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
6.2 Private Key Protection
6.2.1 Standards for cryptographic module
6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
6.2.3 Private key escrow
6.2.4 Private key backup
6.2.5 Private key archival
6.2.6 Private key entry into cryptographic module
6.2.7 Method of activating private key
6.2.8 Method of deactivating private key
6.2.9 Method of destroying private key
6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management
6.3.1 Public key archival
6.3.2 Usage periods for the public and private keys
6.4 Activation Data
6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation
6.4.2 Activation data protection
6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data
6.5 Computer Security Controls
6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements
6.5.2 Computer security rating
6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls
6.6.1 System development controls
6.6.2 Security management controls
6.6.3 Life cycle security ratings
6.7 Network Security Controls
6.8 Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls
7. CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES
7.1 Certificate Profile
7.1.1 Version number(s)
7.1.2 Certificate extensions
7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers
7.1.4 Name forms
7.1.5 Name constraints
7.1.6 Certificate policy Object Identifier
7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension
7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics
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7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical certificate policy
extension
7.2 CRL Profile
7.2.1 Version number(s)
7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions
8. SPECIFICATION ADMINISTRATION
8.1 Specification change procedures
8.2 Publication and notification policies
8.3 CPS approval procedures
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The development of this document was supported by the Government of
Canada's Policy Management Authority (PMA) Committee, the National
Security Agency, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), and the American Bar Association Information Security
Committee Accreditation Technical Working Group. Special thanks are
due to Dave Fillingham, Jim Brandt, and Edmond Van Hees for their
inspiration, support, and valuable inputs.
The following individuals also deserve credit for their review and
input:
Teresa Acevedo, A&N Associates;
Michael Baum; VeriSign;
Sharon Boeyen, Entrust;
Bob Burger, McCarter & English;
Bill Burr, NIST;
Patrick Cain, BBN;
Michael Harrop, Government of Canada Treasury Board;
Rick Hornbeck, Digital Commerce Services;
Francois Marinier, Domus Software;
John Morris, CygnaCom Solutions;
Tim Moses, Entrust;
Noel Nazario, NIST;
John Nicolletos, A&N Associates;
Jean Petty, CygnaCom Solutions;
Denis Pinkas, Bull;
J.-F. Sauriol, Domus Software;
Robert Shirey, BBN;
Mark Silvern, VeriSign;
David Simonetti, Booz, Allen and Hamilton; and
Darryl Stal, Entrust.
Johnny Hsiung, and Chris Miller assisted in the preparation of the
manuscript.
Chokhani & Ford Informational [Page 39]
RFC 2527 PKIX March 1999
[ABA1] American Bar Association, Digital Signature Guidelines: Legal
Infrastructure for Certification Authorities and Electronic
Commerce, 1995.
[BAU1] Michael. S. Baum, Federal Certification Authority Liability
and Policy, NIST-GCR- 94-654, June 1994.
[ISO1] ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T Recommendation X.509, "Information
Technology - Open Systems Interconnection: The Directory:
Authentication Framework," 1997 edition. (Pending publication
of 1997 edition, use 1993 edition with the following amendment
applied: Final Text of Draft Amendment DAM 1 to ISO/IEC 9594-8
on Certificate Extensions, June 1996.)
[PEM1] Kent, S., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail,
Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management", RFC 1422, February
1993.
[PKI1] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC
2459, January 1999.
Santosh Chokhani
CygnaCom Solutions, Inc.
Suite 100 West
7927 Jones Branch Drive
McLean, VA 22102
Phone: (703) 848-0883
Fax: (703) 848-0960
EMail: chokhani@cygnacom.com
Warwick Ford
VeriSign, Inc.
301 Edgewater Place, Suite 210
Wakefield, MA 01880
Phone: (781) 245-6996 x225
Fax: (781) 245-6006
EMail: wford@verisign.com
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NOTES
1 The ABA Digital Signature Guidelines can be purchased from the ABA.
See http://www.abanet.com for ordering details.
2 Examples of types of entity for subject CAs are a subordinate
organization (e.g., branch or division), a federal government
agency, or a state or provincial government department.
3 This statement can have significant implications. For example,
suppose a bank claims that it issues CA certificates to its
branches only. Now, the user of a CA certificate issued by the
bank can assume that the subject CA in the certificate is a branch
of the bank
4 Examples of the types of subject RA entities are branch and
division of an organization.
5 Examples of types of subject end entities are bank customers,
telephone company subscribers, and employees of a government
department
6 This statement can have significant implications. For example,
suppose Government CA claims that it issues certificates to
Government employees only. Now, the user of a certificate issued
by the Government CA can assume that the subject of the certificate
is a Government employee.
7 Examples include X.500 distinguished name, Internet e-mail address,
and URL.
8 The term "meaningful" means that the name form has commonly
understood semantics to determine identity of the person and/or
organization. Directory names and RFC 822 names may be more or
less meaningful.
9 Examples of proof include the issuing CA generating the key, or
requiring the subject to send an electronically signed request or
to sign a challenge.
10 Examples of organization identity authentication are: articles of
incorporation, duly signed corporate resolutions, company seal,
and notarized documents.
11 Examples of individual identity authentication are: biometrics
(thumb print, ten finger print, face, palm, and retina scan),
driver's license, passport, credit card, company badge, and
government badge.
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12 Examples include duly signed authorization papers or corporate ID
badge.
13 The identification policy for routine rekey should be the same as
the one for initial registration since the same subject needs
rekeying. The rekey authentication may be accomplished using the
techniques for initial I&A or using digitally signed requests.
14 This identification and authentication policy could be the same as
that for initial registration.
15 This policy could be the same as the one for initial registration.
16 The identification policy for Revocation request could be the same
as that for initial registration since the same subject
certificate needs to be revoked. The authentication policy could
accept a Revocation request digitally signed by subject. The
authentication information used during initial registration could
be acceptable for Revocation request. Other less stringent
authentication policy could be defined.
17 The identification policy for key compromise notification could be
the same as the one for initial registration since the same
subject certificate needs to be revoked. The authentication
policy could accept a Revocation request digitally signed by
subject. The authentication information used during initial
registration could be acceptable for key compromise notification.
Other less stringent authentication policy could be defined.
18 The n out of m rule allows a key to be split in m parts. The m
parts may be given to m different individuals. Any n parts out of
the m parts may be used to fully reconstitute the key, but having
any n- 1 parts provides one with no information about the key.
19 A key may be escrowed, backed up or archived. Each of these
functions have different purpose. Thus, a key may go through any
subset of these functions depending on the requirements. The
purpose of escrow is to allow a third party (such as an
organization or government) to legally obtain the key without the
cooperation of the subject. The purpose of back up is to allow
the subject to reconstitute the key in case of the destruction of
the key. The purpose of archive is to provide for reuse of the
key in future, e.g., use the private key to decrypt a document.
20 An example of activation data is a PIN or passphrase.
21 Examples of physical access controls are: monitored facility ,
guarded facility, locked facility, access controlled using tokens,
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access controlled using biometrics, and access controlled through
an access list.
22 Examples of the roles include system administrator, system
security officer, and system auditor. The duties of the system
administrator are to configure, generate, boot, and operate the
system. The duties of the system security officer are to assign
accounts and privileges. The duties of the system auditor are to
set up system audit profile, perform audit file management, and
audit review.
23 The background checks may include clearance level (e.g., none,
sensitive, confidential, secret, top secret, etc.) and the
clearance granting authority name. In lieu of or in addition to a
defined clearance, the background checks may include types of
background information (e.g., name, place of birth, date of birth,
home address, previous residences, previous employment, and any
other information that may help determine trustworthiness). The
description should also include which information was verified and
how.
24 For example, the certificate policy may impose personnel security
requirements on the network system administrator responsible for a
CA's network access.
25 Regardless of whether authorized persons are employees, practices
should be implemented to ensure that each authorized person is
held accountable for his/her actions.
26 A cryptographic module is hardware, software, or firmware or any
combination of them.
27 The compliance description should be specific and detailed. For
example, for each FIPS 140-1 requirement, describe the level and
whether the level has been certified by an accredited laboratory.
28 Example of audit events are: request to create a certificate,
request to revoke a certificate, key compromise notification,
creation of a certificate, revocation of a certificate, issuance
of a certificate, issuance of a CRL, issuance of key compromise
CRL, establishment of trusted roles on the CA, actions of truste
personnel, changes to CA keys, etc.
29 Example of archive events are: request to create a certificate,
request to revoke a certificate, key compromise notification,
creation of a certificate, revocation of a certificate, issuance
of a certificate, issuance of a CRL, issuance of key compromise
CRL, and changes to CA keys.
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30 A parent CA is an example of audit relationship.
31 Example of compliance audit topics: sample check on the various
I&A policies, comprehensive checks on key management policies,
comprehensive checks on system security controls, comprehensive
checks on operations policy, and comprehensive checks on
certificate profiles.
32 The examples include, temporary suspension of operations until
deficiencies are corrected, revocation of entity certificate,
change in personnel, invocation of liability policy, more frequent
compliance audit, etc.
33 An organization may choose not to make public some of its security
controls, clearance procedures, or some others elements due to
their sensitivity.
34 All or some of the following items may be different for the
various types of entities, i.e., CA, RA, and end entities.
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ABA - American Bar Association
CA - Certification Authority
CPS - Certification Practice Statement
CRL - Certificate Revocation List
DAM - Draft Amendment
FIPS - Federal Information Processing Standard
I&A - Identification and Authentication
IEC - International Electrotechnical Commission
IETF - Internet Engineering Task Force
IP - Internet Protocol
ISO - International Organization for Standardization
ITU - International Telecommunications Union
NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology
OID - Object Identifier
PIN - Personal Identification Number
PKI - Public Key Infrastructure
PKIX - Public Key Infrastructure (X.509) (IETF Working Group)
RA - Registration Authority
RFC - Request For Comment
URL - Uniform Resource Locator
US - United States
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Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
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HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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